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What the French supermarket fridge attack means for OT security in mid-sized UK businesses

Posted : 26 October 2026

Posted In : Blogs

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Garry 1

Written by:

Garry Owen, Solutions Lead

The attack on French supermarkets this month needed nothing more than out-of-date software and an internet connection. Plenty of UK factories and office blocks have both, Garry Owen, Solutions Lead at Softwerx discusses.

Most mid-sized UK businesses have non-IT equipment on their premises and now on their networks that someone outside can therefore potentially interfere with, and that the people responsible for security have likely never looked at. It might be the building management system, the door access panels or a production line controller, chosen by facilities or operations, fitted by a specialist contractor and put online for management or so that a contractor can maintain it remotely. The industry calls this operational technology, or OT, although in most mid-sized firms nobody calls it anything at all. It doesn’t feel like part of the IT estate, so it rarely gets the attention that laptops and email do. This month’s events show how short-sighted this attitude has become.

On the night of 11 October, attackers reprogrammed the refrigeration – which was network-connected – in hundreds of French supermarkets to defrost, leading to ambient temperatures as high as 50°C (Infosecurity Magazine). France’s finance minister put the number of stores affected at about 700, and prosecutors are looking into reports of fires as well as spoiled food (ITV News). Danfoss, which makes the online controllers, said most of the affected systems were older products that no longer received security updates. The most serious log-in flaw in its newer model had been fixed in March 2025, yet most of the consoles reachable from the internet were still running older software when the attack came (Infosecurity Magazine).

In the three days that followed, unsecured refrigeration consoles in France fell from 1,825 to 537, and unpatched units disappeared at the same rate. Operators unplugged the kit without waiting to update it, which suggests that most of it never needed to be online in the first place. This attacker went for supermarket refrigeration, but the conditions that let them in apply similarly to a great many unrelated use cases common in mid-sized UK businesses – for example, hospital MRI scanners, insulin pumps, or traffic light systems.

The same story in a different building

What happened in France exploits a perfectly standard arrangement in the modern world. A specialist supplier needed remote access to kit it maintains, so the kit went online (Infosecurity Magazine): the service contract said plenty about response times but very little about who keeps the software current or who should notice when settings change at 2am on a Sunday morning or what happens when the commercial operating system it relies on becomes obsolete.

Look at your own estate with that in mind. In a manufacturer it might be the line controllers the systems integrator dials into, where a changed setpoint means a scrapped batch or a line that won’t restart on Monday. In an office-based firm, it could be the building management system or the door access panels. A housing association may run communal heating and door entry across dozens of blocks, where the people on the receiving end are tenants. Care groups have medicine fridges and warehouses have conveyors and yard gates. Whatever the kit, it was usually chosen by facilities or operations with an assumed lifespan of 10 or more years, and networked for manageability and the contractor’s convenience.

The mid-market feels this differently from a national chain. Carrefour said 80 of its 6,000 stores were affected, a little over one per cent of its estate. A business with one factory or one distribution centre has nowhere to spread a loss like that, and often nobody whose job it is either. In a firm of 500 or 800 people, the facilities manager and the IT manager may never have discussed OT, and there’s no OT team between them to pick it up.

The evidence problem

In August, security researchers showed that a compromised controller of this kind could switch off cooling while still reporting normal temperatures. The same applies well beyond refrigeration. The building management dashboard and the quality data coming off a production line are produced by the very systems an attacker would target, so the record you’d rely on to show nothing went wrong can be the first thing affected.

In France, the damage was obvious within hours. A quieter attacker who nudged a process slightly out of tolerance and left the readings alone could cost a mid-sized business a batch or a customer before anyone noticed. Where it matters, a cheap independent sensor with its own connection gives you a second witness.

It’s a question we’d put to any customer whose operation depends on physical kit: if that system lied to you tonight, how would you know?

Nobody is going to make you do this

France’s national cyber security agency issued an alert naming the affected systems within a day. In the UK, unless your business is part of the energy, transport, water, health or digital infrastructure already covered by the NIS Regulations (legislation.gov.uk), nothing obliges you to look. The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill now going through the Lords extends that regime to managed service providers, data centres and designated critical suppliers (UK Parliament), which still leaves the plant room and the factory floor of a typical mid-sized firm outside it. The questions are more likely to arrive in an insurance renewal form or a large customer’s supplier questionnaire, so whatever gets done will be done because the business decided it mattered.

What I’d do this month

Start with a walk round the site alongside whoever runs facilities, asking of every system you pass whether it is connected to your mainstream IT network and as a result, could someone outside change how it behaves? Then contact each system supplier and contractor with remote access and ask how they connect and which software version they’re connecting to. Some will struggle to answer, which is worth knowing before the contract comes up for renewal.

A scan of your own IP ranges that are exposed externally to the internet will find some of this, and Microsoft Defender External Attack Surface Management does that well. You’ll need tools like Microsoft Defender for IoT to monitor your non-IT resources inside your infrastructure, which transparently integrates with Defender XDR and Sentinel for holistic management of your entire environment. In our experience the most revealing finds come from facilities, with the scan hopefully confirming what they’ve told us.

Whatever turns up as being visible to the open internet should come off it immediately, as the French operators did within days. Where a contractor needs remote access, give it to named engineers through a Zero Trust-compliant route that checks who they are each time, which in a Microsoft estate, Entra Private Access can do without exposing the console at all.

At renewal, make software updates and end-of-life notices, the contractor’s responsibility in writing, with a named account for each engineer, and treat reluctance as a reason to look elsewhere. Make sure out-of-hours alarms reach whoever watches your security at night as well as the engineer’s phone. If you run Defender XDR, Defender for IoT can add monitoring of OT into your standard XDR workflows. Understand that the old assumption of 20 to 30 year lifecycles for mission-critical industrial equipment may become problematic in terms of security if it is attached to the network or relies on commercial operating systems such as Windows or Linux): these are rarely supported as standard for longer than 4 or 5 years. What’s the implication of this for equipment lifecycles?

For most of the mid-sized businesses we support, this is a few days’ work spread over a quarter, and the contract conversation usually takes longer than fixing the technology itself.

Then ask your insurance broker, in writing, whether your policy pays if a cyberattack damages industrial equipment or stops production. Plenty of cyber policies are built around data and downtime, leaving physical damage to a property policy with exclusions of its own. Intermarché’s legal and insurance teams are working through exactly that, but a national chain can absorb the answer far more easily than a smaller business with only one site.

The French attack didn’t need anything sophisticated. Software that was out of date or out of support, and a console facing the internet were enough, and the attackers picked a night when the shops were shut. Most mid-sized businesses have their own version of that exposed console somewhere and could probably find it within a week if someone from IT and someone from facilities sat down with the list.

Softwerx works with mid-sized UK organisations that run on Microsoft Security, and most of what I’ve covered in this article can be achieved with standard operating procedures and monitoring of the Microsoft Security stack they already manage. Defender for IoT integrates compliant building and plant systems alongside the laptops and sign-ins you are already managing, and Defender External Attack Surface Management covers what in your network is visible from outside. For contractors who legitimately need a way in, Entra Private Access does the job using Zero Trust principles and without leaving a console on the open internet. The slower part is usually getting facilities, operations and IT onto the same page, so that’s normally where we start. If the answers from your contractors and equipment suppliers come back thinner than you’d like, we’ll happily go through them with you and show you how secure365, our managed XDR solution for the midmarket can extend enterprise-grade cybersecurity to your industrial and IoT estate.

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